Large swings in capital flows into and out of emerging markets can potentially lead to excessive volatility in asset prices and credit supply. In order to lessen the impact of capital flows on financial instability, a number of researchers and policy markers have recently proposed the use of capital controls. This paper considers the benefit of adding capital controls as a potential instrument of monetary policy in a small open economy. In a DSGE framework, we find that when domestic agents are subject to collateral constraints and the value of collateral is subject to fluctuations driven by foreign capital inflows and outflows, the adoption of temporary capital controls can lead to a significant welfare improvement. The benefits of capital controls are present even when monetary policy is determined optimally, implying that there may be a role for capital controls to exist side-by-side with conventional monetary tools as an instrument of monetary policy.
Introduction
Repeated cycles of capital ‡ows into and out of emerging markets is a …xture of the …nancially integrated global economy. Surges in capital in ‡ows have led to talk of "currency wars" and the danger of overheating in many emerging markets. Likewise, a sudden reversal of capital ‡ows has been blamed for the recent …nancial and macroeconomic instability in many emerging markets. Rey (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) show that capital ‡ows into and out of emerging markets are largely driven by global factors. They both show that a measure of global risk is one of the main determinants of international capital ‡ows. Meanwhile, country-speci…c characteristics are largely irrelevant for driving capital ‡ows into and out of a particular emerging market economy. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) argue that surges in capital in ‡ows into emerging markets are associated with a higher likelihood of banking, in ‡ation and currency crises, and contribute to economic and …nancial instability. Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) show that capital in ‡ows are a primary reason for the procyclicality of …scal and monetary policy observed in many emerging markets. Rey (2013) argues that since these foreign capital ‡ows can lead to asset price bubbles, excess credit creation, and …nancial instability, capital controls or some tool of active capital account management is necessary in many countries. She argues that this cycle of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows means that the classic "trilemma" of international …nance is actually more of a "dilemma", and that "independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed." 1 Klein and Shambaugh (2013) dispute this result and instead argue that a country with an open capital account can still gain considerable monetary autonomy by simply allowing its exchange rate to ‡oat.
In a recent paper, the International Monetary Fund (2012) argues that in certain circumstances, active capital controls might be a useful policy instrument to manage the macro-economic and …nancial risks associated with large swings in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. Cordero and Montecino (2010) argue that capital controls can be a useful tool of monetary policy and can help countries keep in ‡ation under control and also maintain a stable and competitive real exchange rate. Ostry, Ghosh, Chamon and Qureshi (2012) show that while capital controls tend to be of limited use in controlling the aggregate volume of capital ‡ows, in ‡ow controls can be a useful instrument of policy to reduce the …nancial stability risks associated with surges in capital in ‡ows. In addition, Forbes, Fratzscher and Straub (2013) show that while capital controls tend to be ine¤ective in managing certain targets like exchange rates, capital ‡ows, interest-rate di¤erentials, in ‡ation, and equity indices, these macroprudential measures can signi…cantly reduce some measures of …nancial fragility. Baba and Kokenyne (2011) and Magud, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011) both …nd that while in practice capital controls do little to a¤ect the volume of capital ‡ows or other key macroeconomic variables, they do tend to "provide room" for monetary policy and tend to make monetary policy more independent in many emerging markets. 2 Fernández, Rebucci and Uribe (2013) discuss how theory suggests that policy makers should use capital controls countercyclically as a tool of macroprudential policy, but empirically they …nd that capital controls tend to be acyclical.
The use of capital controls as an instrument of monetary policy when combined with a …xed exchange rate has been part of the international macro literature since Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) . Jeanne, Subramanian and Williamson (2012) argue that capital controls "properly designed ... might even be a regular instrument of economic policy. "(p. 95) A number of recent papers have addressed this issue of the optimal design of capital controls. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012b) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012a) discuss the optimal use of capital controls in an economy that is the member of a currency union and su¤ers from downward nominal wage rigidity. They show that capital controls can be a viable instrument of policy to overcome the involuntary unemployment caused by wage rigidity.
Here they make use of the constraints imposed by the "trilemma"; in a currency union the country lacks a monetary instrument for stabilization, but capital controls can allow the country to still manipulate the price level and thus the real exchange rate while keeping the nominal exchange rate …xed. Farhi and Werning (2012) reach a similar conclusion, that a counter-cyclical capital controls policy can play a role in macroeconomic stabilization in a small open economy with a …xed exchange rate. Costinot, Lorenzoni and Werning (2011) and De Paoli and Lipinska (2013) both discuss the optimal use of capital controls for dynamic terms-of-trade manipulation.
While these papers consider the role of capital controls as an instrument of monetary policy, usually under a …xed exchange rate regime, they do not address the role of capital controls in fostering …nancial stability. Korinek (2010) , Korinek (2010), Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) , Bianchi (2011), Benigno, Chen, Otrok, Rebucci and Young (2013) , and Korinek (2013) all discuss how the fact that collateral constraints depend on asset prices, which are subject to ‡uctuations from capital in ‡ows, leads to over-borrowing and …nancial vulnerability in a small open economy. Speci…cally the over-borrowing is caused by a pecuniary externality, where agents don't internalize the e¤ect that their collective actions are having on asset prices, and thus collateral constraints. They discuss how counter-cyclical taxes on capital in ‡ows and other macroprudential measures can be used to o¤set this externality and reduce …nancial vulnerabilities.
This paper seeks to combine the insights from these two sides of the literature discussing optimal capital controls. This paper will consider the optimal design of capital controls as an instrument of monetary policy in a model with both sticky prices and collateral constraints.
The sticky prices provide a role for conventional monetary policy in macroeconomic stabilization, while the collateral constraints provide a means through which cycles of capital ‡ows into and out of the small open economy cause …nancial instability. Crucially, the amount that individuals can borrow depends on the value of existing collateral at the current market price. A surge in capital in ‡ows following a foreign shock can push up asset prices and loosen 4 the collateral constraint in the small open economy, leading to excess credit-creation.
The externality created by the presence of the asset price in the collateral constraint leads to a role for policy to counter these surges in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows. We show how this externality leads to a boom-bust cycle in the provision of credit. This paper will proceed as follows. The theoretical model used to derive these optimal policy results is described in section 2. The model is a two-country sticky price DSGE model, where one country is small relative to the rest of the world. In the model, borrowers face collateral constraints where the amount they can borrow depends on the value of existing collateral at the current market price. We show that in this framework the value of collateral, and thus the amount of borrowing in the small open economy, is subject to ‡uctuations based on surges of capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows from the rest of the world. The calibration of the model is discussed in section 3. The results from the model are presented in section 4. Here we will examine responses in the home country to a surge in capital in ‡ows from the rest of the world. We will examine these both under the cases of ‡exible prices (and thus no role for conventional monetary policy) and sticky prices. Finally section 5 concludes with some directions for further research.
The model
In the model there are two countries, home and foreign. As in the New Open Economy
Macro literature in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) , the home country is size n and the foreign country is size 1 n. 
Households
Households supply labor to domestic …rms, and lend their savings to domestic entrepreneurs.
They consume from their labor income and interest on savings. They are risk-averse and derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor e¤ort.
The representative household maximizes its expected lifetime utility given by:
subject to their budget constraint:
where C t is consumption by the household in period t, H t is the household's labor e¤ort in the period, t is pro…t from domestic …rms, returned lump-sum to the household, B t is the household's stock of home currency bonds at the beginning of the period, B f t is the stock of bonds denominated in the foreign currency, S t is the nominal exchange rate in units of the home currency per units of the foreign currency, and W t is the wage rate. The term
represents a tax on holding foreign bonds. This tax is required to ensure stationarity as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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The intertemporal preference shock, A t , follows the stochastic process:
where t+1 = (1 ) + t + " t , and > 0 is a constant to ensure that in the steady state, households are net savers and entrepreneurs are net borrowers. t = (1 + t )
The analogous budget constraint for the foreign household is:
The …rst order condition of the household's problem with respect to domestic bond holdings yields the familiar Fisher equation that links the nominal interest rate, i t+1 , to the real interest rate, r t+1 , and the expected in ‡ation rate, E t ( t+1 )
The real interest rate is given by:
where t is the marginal utility of household consumption.
No arbitrage conditions between home and foreign bonds give rise to the uncovered interest parity conditions (in levels):
St
From these two interest parity conditions, we can see that in this model the tax on the 8 foreign bond holdings of domestic residents, t , must approximately equal the negative of the tax on domestic bond holdings of foreign residents, t .
Entrepreneurs
In each country there is a representative entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs supply labor to domestic …rms. They own capital and rent this capital to …rms. They …nance this stock of capital partially with their own equity and partially by borrowing from households. They are risk-averse and derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor e¤ort.
The representative entrepreneur maximizes its expected lifetime utility given by:
where H e t is the entrepreneur's labor e¤ort, W t is the wage rate, K t is the stock of home country capital held by the representative home country entrepreneur, R t is the rental rate on capital in the home country, and b t is the stock of bonds held by the entrepreneur. Capital accumulation is subject to a constant depreciation rate and investment adjustment costs captured by the function F (I t ; I t 1 ). The stock of capital evolves according to the following capital accumulation equations:
where F (I t ; I t 1 ) = 1 2
Given these capital accumulation equations, in a competitive market where existing capital can traded among entrepreneurs, the price of existing capital, P K t , is given by:
Due to limited enforcement, entrepreneurs face a collateral constraint, they cannot borrow more than t of the expected value of their capital stock:
where the load-to-value ratio, t , can itself be stochastic and thus a source of credit driven business cycle ‡uctuations.
Final Goods Production
In each county, …nal output, which is used for consumption and investment, is produced through a CES combination of home and foreign goods:
is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and is the elasticity of substitution between goods from di¤erent …rms within the same country.
From the aggregator function in (4), and its foreign counterpart (not listed), the demand for the output from home country …rm i 2 [0 n] in both the home and foreign markets is given by:
where P t (i) is the price set by …rm i 2 [0 n]. The Law of One Price holds for the good from …rm i, so if the good has a price P t (i) in the home market, then its price in the foreign market is S t P t (i), where S t is the nominal exchange rate in units of the foreign currency per units of the domestic currency. Thus the various price indices are given by:
is given by:
Due to sticky output prices, the …rm may earn a non-zero pro…t in certain periods. This
is returned lump-sum to the households.
Market clearing in the labor and capital markets requires that the total demand for labor by …rms is equal to the supply of labor from households and entrepreneurs:
and the quantity of physical capital employed by …rms in period t is equal to the economy's stock of physical capital at the beginning of the period:
Price setting by traded goods …rms Firms set prices according to a Calvo style price setting framework. In period t, the …rm will be able to change its price in the domestic market with probability 1 p . If the …rm cannot change prices then they are reset automatically
Thus if allowed to change their price in period t, the …rm will set a price to maximize:
The …rm that is able to change its price in period t will set its price to:
If prices are ‡exible, i.e. p = 0, then this expression collapses to:
which implies that the …rm will change a constant mark-up over its marginal cost.
Write the price set by the …rm that can reset prices in period t asP t (i) to denote that it is an optimal price. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level, sõ
Substitute this optimal price into the price index
Since a …rm has a probability of 1 p of being able to change their price, then by the law of large numbers in any period 1 p percent of …rms will reoptimize prices, and the prices of p percent of …rms will be automatically reset using the previous periods in ‡ation rate.
Thus the price index for domestic traded goods, P d t , can be written as:
Monetary Policy
There is a role for monetary policy in the version of the model with sticky prices. Monetary policy in the home economy is characterized as the solution to a Ramsey problem where the policy maker maximizes the second-order approximation of the sum of the home country household and entrepreneur welfare functions in (1) and (2) subject to the …rst-order conditions and resource constraints for the household, entrepreneur and …rm.
Similarly, monetary policy in the foreign economy is the solution to a Ramsey problem 13 where the policy maker maximizes the second-order approximation of the sum of the foreign country household and entrepreneur welfare functions.
Calibration and Solution
The model's parameters and their values are reported in table 1. The …rst eight parameters in the table, the discount factor, capital's share of value added, the capital depreciation rate, the small constant tax on foreign bond holdings that is used to ensure stationarity, the investment adjustment cost parameter, the probability that a …rm cannot change prices in a given period, and the elasticities of substitution between goods from di¤erent …rms, and between home and foreign traded goods, are all set to values commonly used in the literature.
The relative country size parameter, n, is set very small to ensure that the home economy The steady state value of the discount factor shock, , implies that the …rst-order excess return is about 3.6% per year.
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The parameter measures the entrepreneur's steady state loan to value ratio. We use a value of 0:75, which is the value used by Liu, Wang and Zha (2013) . Iacoviello (2005) estimates this parameter and shows that it lies between 0:55 (for households) and 0:89 (for 5 From the demand functions for domestic and imported traded goods in (5), the steady state import share is: m = 
Shock process and solution procedure
The model is solved with a …rst-order approximation around the steady state where the collateral constraint (3) is binding, as in Iacoviello (2005), Jermann and Quadrini (2012) ,
and Liu et al. (2013) .
We will just consider the e¤ect of shocks originating in the rest of the world on the small open home economy. We will consider the optimal policy response to two foreign shocks that would lead to a surge in capital in ‡ows into the small open economy: a foreign discount factor shock, t , and a shock to the loan-to-value ratio in the foreign entrepreneur's borrowing constraint, t .
We will consider each shock separately. Assume that the foreign discount factor shock is such that it causes a 1% fall in the foreign real interest rate that has a half-life of one quarter. Assume that the foreign credit supply shock is such that it leads to a 1% increase in the multiplier on the foreign borrowing constraint that has a half-life of one quarter.
Since each shock is considered separately and the model is solved with a …rst-order approximation, for the most part the variance of the shocks are immaterial for both simulations and the calculation of optimal policy. The one caveat is that this model is solved with a …rst-order approximation in the neighborhood of the steady state where the collateral constraint is binding. If a shock that loosens this constraint is "too big" it could result in an equilibrium where the constraint does not bind, and thus our approximation around the binding constraint is inaccurate. The need for the collateral constraint to always bind provides an upper bound on the size of the shocks. In the impulse response diagrams in the next section we will plot the response of the multiplier on the collateral constraint and show that it remains positive under every shock.
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In discussing optimal capital controls policy, we will present the results in two steps. First, we will consider optimal capital controls policy in a model with ‡exible prices. We will then consider capital controls policy in a sticky price model, and thus in a model where there is already a role for conventional monetary policy. We will ask if when conventional monetary policy instruments are chosen optimally, is there a role for capital controls as an additional instrument of monetary policy.
Flexible Prices
Figure 1 presents the responses of GDP, investment, net exports, the multiplier on the entrepreneurs collateral constraint, the real exchange rate, and taxes on capital out ‡ows in the small open economy following a foreign discount factor shock, t . As can be seen in the top row of this …gure, this foreign discount factor shock leads to a fall in the foreign real interest rate and a rise in foreign GDP.
Impulse responses from three simulations of the model are presented in the …gure. In all three simulations there is no price stickiness and the collateral constraint is the only source of frictions in the model. The dotted line assumes that there are no collateral constraints in the home economy, so from the perspective of the home country policy maker, this simulation represents the e¢ cient allocation. The solid line assumes that there are collateral constraints in both the home and foreign economies, but in this simulation there are no barriers to the free ‡ow of capital between countries. The dashed line assumes that there are collateral constraints in both the home and foreign economies, but home country policy makers have the option of imposing temporary taxes or subsidies on either the returns home residents receive on foreign bonds (controls on capital out ‡ows) or the return that foreign residents receive on home country bonds (controls on capital in ‡ows). In this model with ‡exible prices, capital controls are the only option available to the policy maker.
Except for the responses of interest rates and net exports, these responses are expressed as percent deviations from the steady state. The responses of interest rates and net exports are presented as percentage point deviations from the steady state. As can be seen in the …gure, this shock to the foreign discount factor leads to an increase in foreign savings and thus a surge in capital in ‡ows into the home economy, as represented by the 1% fall in home net exports, a 1% increase in home investment, and the 0.5% appreciation in the real exchange rate in the e¢ cient allocation. This surge in capital in ‡ows and increase in investment leads to an increase in the price of existing capital. In the version of the model where entrepreneurs face binding collateral constraints, an increase in the price of existing capital loosens this constraint, allowing them to borrow and invest more. The …gure shows that the foreign shock leads to a nearly 6% fall in the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
This then allows entrepreneurs to borrow and invest more and the same foreign shock that led to a 1% increase in investment in the e¢ cient allocation now leads to a 2.5% increase in investment and a nearly 3% fall in net exports. The …gure shows that when the home country policy maker is allowed to impose temporary taxes or subsidies on capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, optimally chosen capital controls can curtail many of the "boom" e¤ects following this foreign shock. The …gure shows that the policy maker will impose a temporary subsidy on the returns from holding foreign bonds (and thus subsidize capital out ‡ows). Since in this model taxes on capital in ‡ows must be the mirror image of taxes on capital out ‡ows, the policy maker will impose a temporary 1.5%
tax on foreign holdings of home country bonds. And thus in the face of a surge in capital in ‡ows from abroad, the optimal policy is to impose temporary controls on capital in ‡ows.
The …gure shows that under optimal capital controls, net exports only fall by 1% following the foreign shock, and this in ‡ow of foreign capital only leads to 0.5% appreciation in the real exchange rate and a 1% loosening of the borrowing constraint. As a result, investment increases by only 1 to 1.5% following the foreign shock. Under optimal capital controls policy, the responses of GDP, investment, and net exports are very similar to their responses in the e¢ cient allocation. Figure 2 presents the responses of these same variables following a shock to the foreign loan-to-value ratio. This shock leads to a sudden increase in the collateral that foreign entrepreneurs need to put up in order to borrow from foreign households, and thus this foreign credit supply shock leads to a fall in foreign investment demand, GDP, and the real interest rate.
As shown in the …gure, this foreign credit supply shock leads to a surge in capital in ‡ows
into the small open home economy. Just as before with the shock to the foreign discount factor, this shock leads to a fall in home net exports and an increase in home investment under the frictionless, e¢ cient allocation where home country entrepreneurs do not face a borrowing constraint. However, when home country entrepreneurs face a constraint, these responses are magni…ed. Just as before, the in ‡ow of foreign capital leads to a surge in the price of entrepreneurs' existing capital, which leads to a loosening of the borrowing constraint and a temporary credit boom in the home economy. The …gure shows that under an optimally chosen capital controls policy, policy makers will impose temporary controls on capital in ‡ows and are thus able to nearly match the responses under the e¢ cient allocation. policy and the optimal set of controls on capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
Sticky Prices
As can be seen in the …gure, the surge in capital in ‡ows causes an appreciation in the home country real exchange rate. Under optimal monetary policy, policy makers sharply cut in nominal interest rate in order to discourage capital in ‡ows, but the exchange rate appreciation still leads to a dramatic fall in home country in ‡ation and GDP. As seen in the model without price frictions, the surge in capital in ‡ows leads to an investment boom in the home country. In the version of the model where entrepreneurs face collateral constraints, the surge in capital in ‡ows leads to an increase in the price of existing capital, which leads to a loosening of the borrowing constraint and a boom in credit and investment in excess of what would occur in the e¢ cient allocation.
However, it is interesting to compare the responses in the model without price frictions in …gure 1 to those in the model with price frictions, and thus a role for conventional monetary policy, in …gure 3. In the model without price frictions, without the use of capital controls, policy makers could do nothing in the face of a surge in foreign capital in ‡ows. The foreign shock led to a 6% fall in the multiplier on the home country entrepreneur borrowing constraint and a 2.5% increase in investment (compared to a 1% increase under the e¢ cient allocation).
When price frictions give a policy makers the conventional monetary policy instrument, policy makers can discourage capital in ‡ows by cutting the nominal interest rate. As seen in …gure 3, now the foreign discount factor shock only leads to a 3% fall in the multiplier on the home entrepreneur's borrowing constraint and a 1.5% increase in investment. This shows that there is a role for conventional monetary policy is curtailing some of the adverse e¤ects of a surge in foreign capital in ‡ows. However, the …gure shows that when capital controls are also available as a policy instrument, just as before the policy maker will impose a temporary tax on capital in ‡ows. This will curtail some of the surge in capital in ‡ows, leading to a smaller exchange rate appreciation, a smaller drop in in ‡ation, a smaller fall in the multiplier on the borrowing constraint and a smaller boom in investment. Thus the …gure shows that conventional monetary policy can react by cutting the nominal interest rate in order to partially curtail any surge in foreign capital in ‡ows, but even when conventional monetary policy is chosen optimally, there is still a role for capital controls as an additional instrument of monetary policy to help counteract the credit boom caused by a surge in capital in ‡ows from abroad.
However, …gure 4 shows that the usefulness of capital controls as an additional instrument of monetary policy is entirely due to the fact that entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint and thus the surge in capital in ‡ows can lead to a loosening of the borrowing constraint and a boom in credit and investment. This same exercise, but in response to a foreign credit supply shock that leads to a surge in foreign capital in ‡ows is presented in …gure 5. The earlier results continue to hold; even when conventional monetary policy is chosen optimally, there is still a role for capital controls as an additional instrument of monetary policy to help counteract the credit boom caused by a surge in capital in ‡ows from abroad.
Fixed Exchange Rate
While it may not constitute optimal conventional monetary policy, it is still interesting to note the responses in the home country to a foreign shock when the home country maintains a …xed nominal exchange rate. The "trilemma of international …nance" states that a country cannot at the same time maintain a …xed nominal exchange rate, an independent monetary policy, and an open capital account. Without capital controls, conventional monetary policy must be dedicated to maintaining the …xed exchange rate and policy makers don't have an independent monetary instrument.
This scenario is presented in …gure 6. The …gure plots the responses in the home economy to the foreign discount factor shock that leads to a surge in foreign capital in ‡ows. This same exercise, but in response to a foreign credit supply shock is presented in …gure 7. Again, when the home country tried to maintain a …xed nominal exchange rate and an open capital account, the loss of an independent monetary policy leads to an outcome that is clearly suboptimal, but the use of temporary capital controls allows the country to maintain a …xed nominal exchange rate without sacri…cing macroeconomic stability.
Conclusion
Dramatic shifts in capital ‡ows into and out of many emerging market economies over the past few years have led some researcher and policy makers to question whether an open capital market is always welfare maximizing. Speci…cally, surges in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows can lead to excessive asset price volatility in many emerging markets. If due to limited enforcement, borrowers in these economies are subject to collateral constraints then these ‡uctuations in asset prices act like an exogenous "shock" on the borrower's collateral constraint. Thus when asset prices are subject to excessive ‡uctuations from capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and borrowers face a collateral constraint that is tied to asset prices, there may be a role for policy to control these excessive capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows and reduce this volatility in the borrower's collateral constraint.
Traditionally, capital controls have been thought of as one leg of the Mundell-Fleming "trilemma of international …nance". Capital controls were necessary for macroeconomic stabilization since they provided a degree of monetary independence for a country with a …xed exchange rate, but if the exchange rate was allowed to ‡oat, capital controls were unnecessary and stabilization could be achieved through monetary policy. However, recent experience has shown that surges in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows can lead to …nancial instability even in countries with a ‡oating exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. In a DSGE framework, this paper shows that the bene…ts of capital controls are present even when monetary policy is determined optimally. Due to the …nancial instability caused by ‡uctuations in capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows, there may be a role for capital controls to exist side-by-side with conventional monetary tools as an instrument of monetary policy. 
22

